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John R. Sellers  
Logicians cannot make sense of science-but they can make sense of logic 
and so they stipulate that science must be presented in terms of their fa- 
vorite logical system. This would be excellent comedy material were it not 
the case that by now almost everyone has started taking the logician seri- 
ously.' 
Orthodox neoclassical economists as well cannot make sense of eco- 
nomics, but they too can make sense of logic and so they stipulate that 
economics must be presented in terms of their favorite logical system 
-logical empiricism-and therein lies one of the fundamental stum- 
bling blocks to progress within the discipline of economics. The neo- 
classical paradigm that now dominates the profession is purportedly 
based upon a methodological foundation of logical empiricism, which 
the neoclassical economists themselves cannot conform to, but which 
nonetheless has proven to be quite useful in undercutting the legitimacy 
of those alternative research programs that do not support the ideologi- 
cal conclusions of neoclassicism. One such alternative research pro- 
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gram, neoinstitutional economics, has been conveniently dismissed as 
illegitimate because it is not "scientific"; that is, it does not conform to 
the rigorous demands of logical empiricism. 
Although neoclassical economics does not meet the requirements of 
its own methodological precepts, our purpose is not to dwell on the 
inadequacies of the neoclassical paradigm or to discuss the substance 
of neoinstitutional thought. Rather, our purpose is to clarify the meth- 
odological foundations of neoinstitutional thought and to argue that 
neoinstitutional economics represents a legitimate research program 
that is, by virtue of its methodology, more consistent with recent devel- 
opments in the philosophy of science. 
The Positivist Tradition and Neoclassical Economics 
The philosophy of science in the twentieth century has encompassed 
the rise of logical positivism, its maturation in logical empiricism, and 
a fundamental attack thereon through the growth of knowledge tradi- 
tion of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and others.* Logical empiri- 
cism grew in the 1940s and 1950s out of the tradition of logical 
positivism, which argued that science progresses through the applica- 
tion of logical analysis to empirical phenomena. In constructing scien- 
tific theories, only those statements that can be verified-that is, 
empirically observed-are accepted as meaningful statements in a the- 
ory. Logical empiricism evolved within this tradition in an effort to 
explicate the derivation of meaningful (verifiable) sentences for theory 
construction. When the prescription that every meaningful sentence of 
a theory be verifiable became too confining, the "emphasis shifted from 
the demarcation of scientific from nonscientific statements to the eval- 
uation of competing theories."3 The evaluation of theories rested upon 
a determination of the correspondence between theory claims and re- 
ality. 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that neoclassicism does not conform 
to the methodological precepts of logical empiricism. Take, for exam- 
ple, the development of consumer theory in neoclassical theory. Con- 
sumer theory developed as a theory of choice whereby individuals 
maximize utility, subject to constraints. Because utility cannot be ob- 
served directly, Paul Samuelson set out to reconstruct consumer theory 
using only observational  concept^.^ The resulting theory of revealed 
preference, as Stanley Wong has demonstrated, is based upon unre- 
stricted universal sentences, contains non-observational terms, and, 
most importantly, derives conclusions that are non-obse~able .~  
The problem facing neoclassicism is, however, more serious than the 
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failure of Samuelson to derive an observational equivalent to ordinal 
utility theory. The fundamental problem for neoclassicism is that the 
maximization hypothesis, while untestable, remains at the core of the 
neoclassical research program and makes the hypotheses of neoclassi- 
cism nonrefutable. The logical positivist shift in emphasis away from 
the testability of individual sentences to evaluation of the empirical 
content of theories is meaningless when the theory is based upon some- 
thing as unamenable to definition as the maximization hypothesis. One 
would have to agree with Mark Blaug that much of the empirical work 
in economics is like "playing tennis with the net down," and produces 
what Blaug has called "innocuous falsifi~ationism."~ 
While one can quite easily argue that the religious-like devotion of 
neoclassical economists to positivism is anything but innocuous, this 
devotion is all the more striking when we consider that positivism has 
been in decline for more than twenty years within the philosophy of 
science. The attack on the positivist tradition accelerated in the 1960s 
with the criticism of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. The criti- 
cisms of post-positivists such as Kuhn and Feyerabend concurrently 
form the underlying foundation of the growth of knowledge tradition. 
Three aspects of the growth of knowledge tradition are examined 
here: the emphasis on specificity over universality, the interactionist 
view, and the rejection of the normative-positive dichotomy. This tra- 
dition, it will be shown, has much in common with the epistemological 
foundations of neoinstitutional thought. 
Post-Positivism and the Critique of Logical Empiricism 
A fundamental aspect of the growth of knowledge tradition has been 
a recognition of the historical nature of inquiry and hence an emphasis 
on specificity over universality within the philosophy of science. Ac- 
cording to Bruce Caldwell, "logical empiricists concerned themselves 
with the elaboration of universal models and procedural rules which 
they believed aptly characterized legitimate scientific practice."' As 
Feyerabend describes the process, the aim of positivists such as Karl 
Popper is to "develop a special point of view, to bring that point into 
logically acceptable form . . . and then to discuss everything in its 
 term^."^ In contrast, post-positivists such as Kuhn and Feyerabend are 
united in stressing the inseparability of the historical context of inquiry 
and the context of justification. "According to Kuhn science is a his- 
torical tradition . . . it is not subjected to external rules, the rules that 
guide the scientist are not always known, and they change from one 
period to the next."9 Post-positivists are less concerned with developing 
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a universal "scientific method" and more concerned with "the growth 
of knowledge over time, the dynamics of change within individual dis- 
ciplines and the actual practices of scientists."1° By stressing the histor- 
ical aspect of inquiry, post-positivists minimize the prescriptive role of 
philosophy of science and, by acknowledging the heterogeneous process 
of inquiry, advocate methodological pluralism. 
A second and related aspect of the post-positivist tradition concerns 
the "interactionist view" of science.'' The interactionist view of science 
concerns the relationship between the scientist qua investigator and the 
objective "fact" awaiting explanation. Instead of accepting as given the 
notion of an "objective" scientist merely evaluating empirical data, 
post-positivists emphasize the interaction of the scientist and the prob- 
lem awaiting empirical examination. According to Feyerabend, science 
combines reason and practice. Logical analysis "serves as a guide who 
is part of the activity guided and is changed by it."'* The interactionist 
view of science essentially views science as a problem-solving activity 
directed not by reason alone, but by the interaction of reason and prac- 
tice. 
Perhaps the most devastating aspect of the post-positivists' critique 
of logical empiricism has been their analysis of the normative-positive 
dichotomy. This distinction between normative and positive has been 
attacked by the post-positivists at several points within the philosophy 
of science. 
First, facts do not exist independently of scientific theories; what is 
construed as a fact depends upon one's theoretical framework. "What 
confronts the observer is usually a choice of fact. Events have a way of 
outstripping observations and there is a richness to existence that com- 
pels a selection."13 Thus the "subjective" perspective of the scientist 
influences the collection of the "objective" data. "On closer analysis we 
even find that science knows no 'bare facts' at all but that the 'facts' 
that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, 
therefore, essentially ideational."14 
Furthermore, having chosen the "facts" to consider, observation of 
the facts also involves subjective perception. As Norwood Hanson 
points out: "In Kohler's famous drawing of the Goblet-and-faces we 
'take' the same retinal/cortical/sense-datum picture of the configura- 
tion; our drawings might be indistinguishable. I see a goblet however, 
and you see two men staring at one another. Do we see the same thing? 
Of course we do. But then again we do not."15 
For Kuhn, the subjective emphasis is not so much on perception as 
on interpretation, for "interpretation begins where perception ends. 
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The two processes are not the same, and what perception leaves for 
interpretation to complete depends drastically on the nature and 
amount of prior experience and training."16 
It is clear from the above discussion that the normative-positive dis- 
tinction represents a false dichotomy. Through selection, perception, 
and interpretation, "objective facts" reflect subjective judgments. The 
post-positivist distinction incorrectly divorces fact from value and sub- 
ject from object. The criticisms of positivism embodied in the growth 
of knowledge tradition have been sufficiently effective to relegate the 
methodology of positivism and the positivist tradition to the archives 
of intellectual history.17 Moreover, the growth of knowledge tradition 
exposes the weaknesses of the Cartesian system that underlies positiv- 
ism and its forced separation of fact and value, normative and positive. 
In recent decades, the philosophy of science has moved away from the 
Cartesian tradition toward an integration of fact and value. Similarly, 
neoinstitutionalists, through their methodological forbearers, the 
American pragmatists, have also sought to integrate fact and value. 
Post-Positivists Aspects of Neoinstitutional Thought 
Neoinstitutional thought combines the instrumental logic of John 
Dewey and the social value theory of Clarence Ayres, J. Fagg Foster, 
and Marc Tool.18 Although the epistemological foundation of neoinsti- 
tutional thought was developed by Dewey more than fifty years ago, it 
has much in common with the growth of knowledge tradition within 
the philosophy of science. 
John Dewey viewed the process of inquiry as a distinctly historical 
process, not unlike Kuhn and Feyerabend. For Dewey, science was 
what scientists were doing as opposed to what philosophy said they 
were supposed to be doing. Furthermore, Dewey considered it incum- 
bent on philosophy to adapt the method of inquiry to its own uses: 
"The central question thus arises: What determines the selection of op- 
erations to be performed? There is but one answer:-the nature of the 
problem to be dealt with."19 
As a historical process, instrumental logic emphasizes specificity 
over universality by taking as its focal point the problematic or unre- 
solved situation. As Dewey points out, inquiry begins with a problem- 
atic situation-a real state of affairs, subject to question, testing, and 
possible resolution. The inquirer goes about the business of organizing 
facts and ideas according to their efficacy in resolving the problematic 
situation into a "unified wh01e."~O Dewey sees this as a creative process 
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in which ideas "occur at first simply as suggestions. . . . The suggestion 
becomes an idea when it is examined with reference to its functional 
fitness, its capacity as a means of resolving the given ~ituation."~' 
The logic of inquiry recognizes no universal prescriptive method and 
emphasizes the interaction of the scientist and the environment 
through the process of experimentation. Through experimentation, 
theory and practice are linked together by necessity; one is meaningless 
without the other. This functional integration characterizes the experi- 
mental method as Dewey saw it.22 
It is this integration of theory and practice through the experimen- 
tal method that makes instrumentalism both a theory of logic and a 
principle of ethical analysis, and leads Dewey to eschew the normative- 
positive dichotomy.23 For Dewey, the process of valuation is unavoid- 
able in inquiry because inquiry is directed by reference to a problem 
situation: "All conduct that is not simply either blindly impulsive or 
mechanically routine seems to involve valuations. The problem of val- 
uation is thus closely associated with the problem of the structure of 
the sciences of human activities and human  relation^."^^ 
Like Feyerabend, Dewey recognized that because science is a problem- 
solving activity, the selection of "facts" to be considered is determined 
by the subjective awareness of a problem situation. "To see that a situ- 
ation requires inquiry is the initial step of inquiry."2s However, whereas 
the growth of knowledge tradition recognizes the subjective nature of 
inquiry through selection, perception, and interpretation of "objective 
facts," the neoinstitutionalist tradition attempts to develop a theory of 
value to be used in evaluating and resolving the problem situation. 
Social value theory is the cornerstone of the neoinstitutionalist per- 
spective that is used in evaluating problem situations through the use 
of instrumental logic. As such, the social value theory of neoinstitution- 
alist thought represents the explicit and full recognition of the norma- 
tive aspects of inquiry: 
What neoinstitutionalists wish to raise to full scholarly awareness is that 
value premises permeate the whole of social inquiry. If inquiry is purpos- 
ive-and it must be-it is value laden. Inquiry necessarily requires a con- 
tinuing and successive exercise in the making of choices. To choose among 
or between items compels recourse to a criterion on the basis of which 
such choices can be made.26 
The social value principle of neoinstitutionalist thought, drawing on 
contributions of Veblen, Ayres, and Foster and synthesized by Tool, 
proposes a criterion for social value that provides for "the continuity 
of human life and the noninvidious recreation of community through 
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the instrumental use of knowledge" and stresses four fundamental ele- 
ments: the principle of continuity, instrumental effectiveness, recreat- 
ing community, and noninvidiou~ness.~~ While some will argue that 
the application of the principle of instrumental value theory to problem 
situations does not lead to clear and obvious answers or resolutions, 
the process of instrumental value theory represents an explicit attempt 
to formulate not only a meaningful approach to inquiry, but an explicit 
criterion by which to evaluate problem situations facing society. 
Finally, like the growth of knowledge tradition, neoinstitutionalists 
do not reject empirical analysis as such, but recognize the normative 
aspects of empirical research. What neoinstitutional thought provides,, 
however, is an explicit value theory to guide empirical analysis, for 
"[tlheory building and empiricism uninformed by explicitly articulated 
value premises are like loaded guns; we know they are very powerful 
but we know not where to aim them."28 
Conclusion 
What is perhaps most important for the construction of a policy sci- 
ence is the ability of its practitioners to address existential problems of 
concern to the public. Neoclassical economics fails in this regard and 
much of the blame must be laid at the methodological doorstep. In its 
attempt to emulate a defunct positivist methodology in the hope of ap- 
pearing "scientific," economics has become a sterile game played for 
the entertainment of economists. 
One cannot help but question why neoclassical economics continues 
to invoke positivism as the only acceptable methodology when posi- 
tivism has been in decline for more than twenty years within the philos- 
ophy of science. The answer, we believe, is that the positivist tradition 
has been instrumental in allowing orthodox economists to castigate 
those alternative research programs that do not support the ideological 
conclusions of neoclassicism. Thus, institutional economics has been 
dismissed under the rubric of "science" because it does not conform in 
toto to the rigorous demands of logical empiricism. 
Our objective has been to argue that neoinstitutional thought can no 
longer be rejected by appealing to the authority of philosophy of science 
because recent developments within the philosophy of science have 
discredited the foundations of the positivist tradition and have much 
in common with the epistemological foundations of neoinstitutional 
thought. 
The importance of understanding the post-positivist aspects of neo- 
institutional thought can hardly be overstated in that the status of neo- 
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institutional thought as a valid research tradition depends in large part 
on the recognition of the valid methodological aspects of this approach. 
We would agree with Paul Diesing, "[tlhe one remaining useful route 
for the neoclassicists is to recognize the very limited validity of their 
perspective, and to treat it as a supplement to other, broader perspec- 
t ive~."?~ Such a perspective we find in neoinstitutionalism. 
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